Our HSBC research report released August of 2016 has proven to be 110% correct as the company reports an 82% drop in year over year earnings.

Subscription short list of Smart phone component vendors


Saturday, 12 February 2011 03:31

Shadow Inventory Analysis

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This is a free addendum to the post: On Shorting Stocks, Double Dips and the UAL/CAL Merger.

Be sure to use the horizontal scroll bar at the bottom of this spreadsheet to scroll towards the right...

Free and Retail subscribers should strongly consider upgrading to access our Premium Pro and Institutional Content (much more dense and informative). The subscription addendum to this is the product of exhaustive research (about a 1 and 1/2 man/months) to whittle this list of over 1,400 companies down to 7 who will make the most profitable short candidates. The professional and institutional level subscriptions will include full forensic analysis of those companies as well as the results from our financial short list as well.

The professional and institutional level subscriptions will include full forensic analysis of those companies as well as the results from our financial short list as well as an upgraded version of the shortlist that contains 33 companies and computed metrics for:

  • Valuation
  • Solvency
  • Growth
  • and other ratios.

Professional subscribers can access an expanded list of 33 companies here and institutional subscribers can access the expanded list here.

This is the Pro and Institutional subscription addendum to the post: Non-Financial Companies to Short in 2010.

Following are the key weak points of the six analyzed companies (for subscribers only):

  • GET US equity – The Company is in hotel business and is witnessing sharp declines in sales. The sales declined 5.6% in 2009 and the analysts are expecting a further y-o-y decline of 17.3% in 2010. The interest coverage is extremely low at 1.11x based on the annualized interest expense in 2010 and TTM EBITDA. Looking at the  debt maturity schedule, there are no maturities till July 2012. The valuation is also stretched with the company trading at EV/EBITDA (2010e) of 19.9x.The stock has increased nearly 103% in the last one year
  • USG US equity – We covered this company earlier and we have again shortlisted this company owing to extremely weak fundamentals. The company continues to record sharp decline in sales with y-o-y decline of 29.8% and 17.1% in 2009 and 1Q10 respectively. The TTM EBITDA margin has been declining and became negative in 1Q10. While the company has no major debt maturity till 2014, the negative operating cash flows require financing which might become a concern amid the weak fundamentals. The weak fundamentals also undermine the valuations. The company is trading at EV/EBITDA (2010e) of 42.2x. The stock has increased nearly 51.5% in the last one year.
  • GGC US Equity – The Company is a chemical manufacturer and has recorded sharp decline in sales and EBITDA in 2009. While the sales have picked up in 1Q10, the margin continues to decline. In 1Q10. While the sales grew nearly 55% (y-o-y), EBITDA grew just 3.0% (y-o-y). On TTM basis, the EBITDA margin has come down to 6.6% in 1Q10 against peak of 8.0% in 3Q09. The interest coverage on TTM basis has improved to 2.05x against 1.11x in 2009 largely owing to decline in interest expense resulting from conversion of large chunk of debt into equity. While the company’s interest coverage is stable at these levels and the company has no major maturities till 2013, the debt ratios are extremely high. Net Debt to market cap is 129% and Net debt to common equity is 198%. Another noteworthy weakness of this company is the lack of cash generation from operating activities owing to increasing working capital needs over the last one year. Receivables and inventories amounted to nearly 33.1% of the total assets against 22.9%, year ago. Total working capital has increased to 43% over the last three quarters.  The company is trading at EV/EBITDA (2010e) of 8.4x. The stock has increased remained flat over the last one year.
  • SFD US Equity – We covered this company earlier and we have again shortlisted this company. While the sales have picked up and margins are improving, the interest coverage continues to remain depressed. Base on annualized interest expense of 1Q10 and consensus estimates for EBITDA in 2010, the interest coverage is 1.5x. The company is trading at EV/EBITDA (2010e) of 13.7x. The stock has increased nearly 64.7% in the last one year.

The other last comp – STON is a small company with float of less than 15 million shares and is involved in cemetery business. The primary concern for STON is very low interest coverage which hovers around 1.0x in 2009 and 2010.

Be sure to use the horizontal scroll bar at the bottom of this spreadsheet to scroll towards the right...

Retail subscribers should strongly consider upgrading to access our Premium Pro and Institutional Content (much more dense and informative). The subscription addendum to this is the product of exhaustive research (about a 1 and 1/2 man/months) to whittle this list of over 1,400 companies down to 7 who will make the most profitable short candidates. The professional and institutional level subscriptions will include full forensic analysis of those companies as well as the results from our financial short list as well.

The professional and institutional level subscriptions will include full forensic analysis of those companies as well as the results from our financial short list as well as an upgraded version of the shortlist that contains 33 companies and computed metrics for:

  • Valuation
  • Solvency
  • Growth
  • and other ratios.

Professional subscribers may click here to access this expanded list of candidates.

Complete smartphone component vendor list, shortlist, and selection criteria for professionals and institutions.


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Tuesday, 21 December 2010 11:43

The BoomBustBlog Interactive Mobile OS Model

Written by

The free preview of the Mobile OS Market Share Model

Other relevant links of interest:

Subscription Content (click here to subscribe):

Free Content:

  1. Google’s 3rd Quarter Operating Results: The Foregone Conclusion That Was Amazingly Unanticipated by the Street!!! Monday, November 8th, 2010 and 
  2. A Glimpse of the BoomBustBlog Internal Discussion Concerning the Fate of Apple
  3. There Is Another Paradigm Shift Coming in Technology and Media: Apple, Microsoft and Google Know its Winner Takes All
  4. The Mobile Computing and Content Wars: Part 2, the Google Response to the Paradigm Shift
  5. An Introduction to How Apple Apple Will Compete With the Google/Android Onslaught
  6. A First in the Mainstream Media: Apple’s Flagship Product Loses In a Comparison Review to HTC’s Google-Powered Phone
  7. Android is gaining preference as the long-term choice of application developers
  8. A Glimpse of the BoomBustBlog Internal Discussion Concerning the Fate of Apple
  9. Math and the Pace of Smart Phone Innovation May Take a Byte Out of Apple’s (Short-lived?) Dominance
  10. Apple on the Margin
  11. RIM Smart Phone Market Share, RIP?
  12. Android Now Outselling iOS? Explaining the Game of Chess That Google Plays in the Smart Phone Space


  13. More of the Android Onslaught: Increasing Handset Revenues and Growth

  14. The BoomBustBlog Multivariate Research in Motion Valuation Model: Ready for Download
  15. The Complete, 63 pg Google Forensic Valuation is Available for Download
  16. iSuppli Continues to Validate BoomBustBlog’s Original Thesis: Android as the Viral Game Changer!
  17. BoomBustBlog Research Hits Another One Out the Park! Google up nearly 10% after hours, true blowout earnings unlike JPM
  18. As I Warned in June, DO NOT DISCOUNT Microsoft in This Mobile Computing War! Their Marketing Campaign is PURE GENIUS! and it Appears as if the Phone Ain’t Bad Either
  19. Reggie Middleton Wasn’t the ONLY Openly Apple Bear in the Blogoshpere, Was He?

  20. Goldman’s $430 Target, Screaming Buy On Apple At Its All Time High Is In Direct Contravention To Reggie Middleton’s Logic – Who’s Right? Well, Who Has Been More Right In The Past?

Untitled document

In "With the Euro Disintegrating, You Can Calculate Your Haircuts Here",  I explicitly illustrated the likely loss to principal of sovereign debt investors who would be forced to take haircuts "for the cause". While we fully stand behind the calculations and the logic, chances are several sovereigns may attempt to undergo sleight of hand in order to placate investors as best they can. We suspect we will soon be hearing of significant restructuring plans in the Eurozone, starting with Greece. The piece below expands on these thoughts and offers subscribers live spreadsheets that illustrate the potential repercussions. It is recommended that these scenarios be taken into consideration in light of the info offered in the post "Introducing The BoomBustBlog Sovereign Contagion Model: Thus far, it has been right on the money for 5 months straight!" and compared to the haircut analysis as well. All paying subscribers are welcome to review our analytical overview of Greece's public finances (Greece Public Finances Projections) as well as the full Pan European Sovereign Debt Crisis analysis which is freely available to everyone.

Greek Restructuring Scenarios

There are several precedents of sovereign debt restructuring through maturity extension without taking an explicit  haircut on the principal amount, and many analysts are predicting something of a similar order for Greece. This form of restructuring is usually followed as a preemptive step in order to avoid a country from technically defaulting on its debt obligation due to lack of funds available from the market. It primarily aims to ease the liquidity pressures by deferring the immediate funding requirements to later periods and by spreading the debt obligations over a longer period of time. It also helps in moderating the increase in interest expenditure due to refinancing if the rates are expected to remain high in the near-to medium term but decline over the long term.

However, the two major negative limitations of this form of restructuring if applied to Greek sovereign debt restructuring are –

  • It solves only the liquidity side of the problem which means that the refinancing of the huge debt (expected to reach 133% of GDP by the end of 2010) will be spread over a longer time period while the debt itself will continue to remain at such high levels. The sustainability of such high debt level, which is growing continuously owing to the snowball effect and the primary deficit, is and will continue to be highly questionable. Greek public finances are burdened by a very large interest expense which is approaching 7% of GDP. The government’s revenues are sagging and the drastic austerity measures need to first bridge the huge primary deficit (which was 8.6% of GDP in 2009), before generating funds to cover the interest expenditure and reduce debt.

Thus, even though the amount of funds required each year to refinance the maturing debt will be reduced by extending maturities, the solvency and sustainability issues surrounding Greece’s public finances, which were the primary reasons for it’s being ostracized from the market in the first place, will remain unanswered.

  • It will lead to a very material decline in present value of cash flows for the creditors since the average coupon rate is lower than the cost of capital (reflected by the yields on the Greek bonds). The average coupon rate for bonds maturing between 2010 and 2020 is about 4.4% while the average benchmark yield for bonds with maturities from 1-10 years is nearly 7.5%. Also, as the maturity of the debt is extended, the risk increases and so does the cost of capital.

In order to assess the effectiveness of this form of restructuring for Greek sovereign debt, we have built three scenarios in which the maturities of the Greek debt is extended. These scenarios weren’t designed to be exact predictions of the future but to represent what may happen under a variety of highly likely scenarios (a pessimistic, base and optimistic case, so to say):

  • Restructuring 1 – Under this scenario, we assumed that the creditors with debt maturing between 2010 and 2020 will exchange their existing debt securities with new debt securities having same coupon rate but double the maturity.
  • Restructuring 2 – Under this scenario, we assumed that the creditors with debt maturing between 2010 and 2020 will exchange their existing debt securities with new debt securities having half the coupon rate but double the maturity.
  • Restructuring 3 – Under this scenario, the debt maturing between 2010 and 2020 will be rolled up into one bundle and exchanged against a single, self-amortizing 20-year bond with coupon equal to average coupon rate of the converted bonds.

In all the three scenarios, we computed the total funding requirements and compared the same with funding requirements prior to restructuring. It is observed that restructuring will help in easing the immediate pressure of procuring funds to meet the huge funding requirements lined up in the next 5 years. However, it will also lead to substantial loss to creditors in the form of erosion of present value of cash flows. (Discount rate was the benchmark yields of Greek government bonds for similar maturity period).

  • Under restructuring scenario 1, the decline in present value of cash flows is 9.3% and the cumulative funding requirements between 2010 and 2025 reduces to 155.2% of GDP from cumulative funding requirements of 177.7% of GDP if there is no restructuring. The cumulative new debt raised will decline to 78.6% of GDP from 80.7% of GDP if there is no restructuring
  • Under restructuring 2, where the doubling of maturity is also accompanied by halving the coupon rate, the decline in present value of cash flows is 26.3% and the cumulative funding requirements between 2010 and 2025 reduces to 116.9% of GDP. The cumulative new debt raised will decline to 40.3% of GDP
  • Under restructuring 3, the decline in present value of cash flows is 18.0% and the cumulative funding requirements between 2010 and 2025 reduce to 131.5% of GDP. The cumulative new debt raised will decline to 69.0% of GDP.

We have also built in the impact of EU/IMF assistance to demonstrate the impact on funding requirements over the period 2010-2025. We assume that IMF/EU will disburse the entire assistance of EUR 110 billion by 2013. The IMF loans will have to be repaid after 3 years from the disbursement date and the payment will be distributed over the next two years. The EU loans will have to be repaid after 3 years from the disbursement date and the payment will be distributed over the next five years. It is observed that IMF – EU assistance will be just a short term relief and Greece will face the pressure when it will be forced to turn to the market to not only fund its maturing debt but also repay EU-IMF loans.

Conclusion – It is seen that the restructuring by maturity extension will marginally moderate liquidity concerns. But the primary and the more fundamental concerns about the high level of debt and the related refinancing and interest rate risks, the huge interest burden, the poor primary balance will be left unresolved by this form of restructuring. The revenues are weak and expenditures are high resulting in huge primary deficit and the government need to first fill this huge gap before it earns a primary surplus to cover the interest expense and reduce debt levels.

The government debt currently stands at 124.5% of GDP and is expected to balloon to 156.1% of GDP owing to lack of funds from primary balance to cover the interest expenditure which continues to add to the government debt levels. The three scenarios built for maturity extension show that maturity extension will not substantially help this issue to contain the ballooning government debt. Under restructuring 1, 2 and 3, the government debt is expected to stand at 154.4%, 123.7% and 147.0% of GDP at the end of 2025.



 

Disclaimer

 

Reggie Middleton, LLC's Boom Bust Blog analysis and conclusions in this presentation are based on publicly available information. Reggie Middleton, LLC recognizes that there may be confidential information in the possession of the Companies discussed in the presentation that could lead these Companies to disagree with Reggie Middleton LLC's conclusions. The analyses provided may include certain statements, estimates and projections prepared with respect to, among other things, the historical and anticipated operating performance of the Companies. Such statements, estimates, and projections reflect various assumptions by Reggie Middleton, LLC concerning anticipated results that are inherently subject to significant economic, competitive, and other uncertainties and contingencies and have been included solely for illustrative purposes. No representations express or implied, are made as to the accuracy or completeness of such statements, estimates or projections or with respect to any other materials herein. The content herein is not, and should not be considered, investment advice of any form or fashion. Users of this content agree to hold harmless and indemnify BoomBustBlog, Reggie Middleton, LLC and its agents, contractors, members, employees and associates against any action that may occur out of the use of this material.

Actual results may vary materially from the estimates and projected results contained herein. Reggie Middleton, LLC and its affiliates may own investments that are bullish or bearish on the subject entity in this material. These investments may include credit-default swaps, equity put or call options, warrants and short sales of common stock. Reggie Middleton, LLC is in the business of trading - buying and selling - public and private securities. It is possible that there will be developments in the future that cause Reggie Middleton, LLC to change its position regarding the Companies and possibly increase, reduce, dispose of, or change the form of its investment in the Companies.

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